Newly Released FBI Timeline Reveals New Information about 9/11 Hijackers that Was Ignored by 9/11 Commission

Latest Findings Raise New Questions about Hijackers and Suggest Incomplete Investigation


A contributor to the History Commons has obtained a 298-page document entitled Hijackers Timeline (Redacted)from the FBI, subsequent to a Freedom of Information Act request. Thedocument was a major source of information for the 9/11 Commission’sfinal report. Though the commission cited the timeline 52 times in itsreport, it failed to include some of the document’s most importantmaterial.
The printed document is dated November 14, 2003, but appears tohave been compiled in mid-October 2001 (the most recent date mentionedin it is October 22, 2001), when the FBI was just starting tounderstand the backgrounds of the hijackers, and it contains almost noinformation from the CIA, NSA, or other agencies. This raises questionsas to why the 9/11 Commission relied so heavily on such an early draftfor their information about the hijackers.
Specific new information:
[list]
[*]New evidence suggests that some of the hijackers wereassisted by employees of the Saudi government. It has previously beenreported that Omar al-Bayoumi, a Saudi who was paid by the Saudigovernment despite not doing any work, assisted hijackers KhalidAlmihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi when they first moved to the US. The FBItimeline shows that when these two hijackers moved into their first SanDiego apartment, they indicated that they had been living with Bayoumiin the apartment next door for the previous two weeks. In fact, theyhad been with him in that apartment since January 15, 2000, the veryday they first flew into the US, arriving in Los Angeles. The timelinealso reveals that hijacker Hani Hanjour was seen in Bayoumi’s apartment.
[*]
Omar al-Bayoumi. [Source: Saudi Government via Al Arabiya]
The new book The Commissionby New York Times reporter Philip Shenon published last week furtherreveals that Bayoumi had close ties to Fahad al-Thumairy, a radicalimam working in the Saudi consulate in Los Angeles. For instance,Bayoumi frequently called al-Thumairy while living next door to the twohijackers, and also frequently called the Saudi embassy in Washington, D.C.The book also reveals that the 9/11 Commission was aware of “explosive”revelations about the ties between Bayoumi, Thumairy, and the twohijackers, but the commission’s final report omitted “virtually all ofthe most serious allegations against the Saudis,” due to diplomaticconsiderations. Now, thanks to this FBI timeline, we are discoveringmore of this suppressed evidence relating to Saudi Arabia.
[*]Securitycamera footage obtained by the FBI after 9/11 indicated that KhalidAlmihdhar and possibly Salem Alhazmi cased Dulles Airport inWashington, D.C., the evening before 9/11. This fits the account of a security guard, related in Unsafe at Any Altitude by Joe and Susan Trento, whoindependently claimed to have seen two hijackers, Salem’s brother Nawafand Marwan Alshehhi, casing Dulles Airport the night before 9/11. Thisguard claims the two hijackers were part of a group of five men, threeof whom were dressed in United Airlines ramp worker uniforms, thatbehaved suspiciously. Despite a lawsuit by 9/11 victims’ relativesagainst United Airlines and others for negligence, the US governmenthas never revealed the existence of this video footage which mightsupport claims that the hijackers had inside help.
[*]HijackersMarwan Alshehhi and Hamza Alghamdi purchased hundreds of dollars of“pornographic video and sex toys” in Florida. They spent $252 on videoand toys in early July 2001, and then another $183 later that month.Furthermore, Satam Al Suqami likely paid for a sex escort in Boston onSeptember 7, 2001. Alshehhi was also recognized by six dancers atCheetah’s, a nightclub in Pompano Beach, Florida. This fits in with other evidence of the hijackers drinking alcohol, paying for lap dancers, watching pornographic videos, etc…—hardly the expected behavior of religious radicals.
[*]OnMarch 20, 2000, either Khalid Almihdhar or Nawaf Alhazmi used a phoneregistered to Alhazmi to make a call from San Diego to an al-Qaeda communications hub in Sana’a, Yemen, run by Almihdhar’s father-in-law.The call lasted 16 minutes. According to the 9/11 CongressionalInquiry, the call was intercepted by the NSA, which had beenintercepting Alhazmi and Almihdhar’s calls for over a year, but the FBI was not informedof the hijackers’ presence in the US. The call is only brieflymentioned as a family phone call by the 9/11 Commission in a endnote,and it is not mentioned that the call was monitored.
[*]
Satam Al Suqami ‘s remarkably undamaged passport, marked and wrapped in plastic. [Source: FBI]
When hijacker Satam Al Suqami’s passport was recovered on 9/11 on the street near the World Trade Center, it was “soaked in jet fuel.”
[*]HijackerHamza Alghamdi booked several flights after 9/11. He booked acontinuation from Los Angeles to San Francisco later on the day of theattacks. Then, on September 20, he planned to fly from Rome toCasablanca, to Riyadh, to Damman, Saudi Arabia.
[*]It has beenwidely assumed that the hijackers did everything using their realnames, or aliases close to their real names. But a still-classified CIAreport found that the hijackers used 364 aliases and name variants.The FBI’s timeline discloses what some of them were. For example, HaniHanjour and Ahmed Alghamdi rented a New Jersey apartment using thenames Hany Saleh and Ahmed Saleh. Fayez Ahmed Banihammad used thealiases Abu Dhabi Banihammad and Fayey Rashid Ahmed. Mohamed Attafrequently liked to use variants of the name El Sayed, for instancecalling himself Awaid Elsayed and even Hamburg Elsayed. And when MajedMoqed flew into the US on May 2, 2001, the name Mashaanmoged Mayed wason the flight manifest. This suggests that some travel and actions ofthe hijackers could have been missed when they used unlikely aliases.
[*]
An ATM video still of Hani Hanjour (left) and Majed Moqed (right). [Source: FBI]
There has been very little video footage released of the hijackers. Sofar, the only known footage has been two video stills of Hani Hanjourand Majed Moqed using an ATM machine, one still each of Waleed Alshehriand Satam Al Suqami, several stills of Mohamed Atta and AbdulazizAlomari in Portland the night before 9/11, and a few more stills and footage of several hijackers in airports on the morning of 9/11.But the FBI’s timeline reveals there is more video footage that hasnever even been publicly hinted at: Mohamed Atta used an ATM in PalmBeach, Florida, on July 19, 2001. Salem Alhazmi and Ahmed Alghamdi usedan ATM in Alexandria, Virginia, on August 2. Hanjour and Mojed used aKinko’s for half an hour in College Park, Maryland, on August 10. Moqedand Nawaf Alhazmi shopped at an Exxon gas station in Joppa, Maryland,on August 28. Waleed and Wail Alshehri wandered around a Target storein Fort Lauderdale, Florida, on September 4. Atta and Abdulaziz Alomariwere in a Florida bank lobby on September 4, and the audio of Attacalling Saudi Arabia was even recorded in the process. Fayez AhmedBanihammad used an ATM on September 7 in Deerfield Beach, Florida.Salem Alhazmi was at the Falls Church DMV on September 7. Low qualitysurveillance video at the Milner Hotel in Boston showed Alshehhi andpossibly Mohand Alshehri on multiple occasions in the days just before9/11. Ziad Jarrah and possibly Saeed Alghamdi were videotaped using aKinko’s for about an hour near Newark on September 10.
[*]Somecredit cards used by the hijackers were still used in the US after9/11. For instance, a credit card jointly owned by Mohamed Atta andMarwan Alshehhi was used twice on September 15. This helps confirm newsreports from late 2001 that hijacker credit cards were used on the East Coast as late as early October 2001.At the time, a government official said that while some of the cardsmight have been stolen, “We believe there are additional people outthere” who helped the hijackers.
[*]The FBI timeline shows otherintriguing hints that the hijackers had associates in the US. Forinstance, on September 8, 2001, hijackers Majed Moqed and Hani Hanjourwent to a bank with an unnamed Middle Eastern male. This man presenteda Pennsylvania driver’s license for identification, but none of the9/11 hijackers have been reported to have a driver’s license from thatstate. There is also a highly redacted section hinting that a woman inLaurel, Maryland, was helping Middle Eastern men and may have had linksto hijackers Mohamed Atta and Ziad Jarrah.
[*]Around 10:00 a.m. onthe morning of 9/11, a housekeeper at the Park Inn in Boston went toclean the room that hijackers Wail and Waleed Alshehri used the nightbefore. She was confronted by a foreign male who told her that someonewas still sleeping in the room and that she should come back around1:00 p.m. The FBI was obviously puzzled by this, as the FBI’s timelineentry for this event ends with five question marks.
[*]It has previously been reported that shortly before 9/11, hijackers Nawaf Alhamzi and Khalid Almihdhar left a bag at a mosquein Laurel, Maryland, with a note attached to it saying, “Gift for thebrothers.” The FBI’s timeline identifies this mosque as the AyahIslamic Center. But the only contents mentioned in the bag were pilotlog books, receipts, and other evidence documenting the brief flighttraining that Alhazmi and Almihdhar underwent in San Diego in early2000. It is unclear why they would have kept the receipts, somementioning their names, for over a year and then left them at a mosqueto be found. After 9/11, a former high-level intelligence official told journalist Seymour Hersh that “Whatever trail was left [by the hijackers] was left deliberately—for the FBI to chase.”
[*]OnJune 11, 2001, hijackers Saeed Alghamdi, Ahmed Alnami, Marwan Alshehhi,and Mohamed Atta checked in to the Deluxe Inn, in Dania, Florida. Themanager of the hotel later identified Saeed Alghamdi as having beenthere at the time with the others. However, travel records indicateAlghamdi did not arrive in the US until June 27. Other previouslyreleased evidence has suggested that many other hijackers were in the US before they officially arrived.
[*]
Luai Sakra imprisoned in Turkey. [Source: Reuters]
Several months ago, the London Times reported on an al-Qaeda leaderimprisoned in Turkey named Luai Sakra. Sakra claims to have trained six of the hijackers in Turkey,including Satam Al Suqami. The FBI’s timeline supports his account,because Al Suqami’s passport record indicates he spent much of his timebetween late September 2000 and early April 2001 in Turkey.Furthermore, Sakra claimed that Al Suqami was one of the hijackerleaders, and not just another “muscle” hijacker as US investigatorshave alleged. The FBI’s timeline supports this, because it shows thatAl Suqami was frequently on the move from 1998 onwards, flying toSyria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, United ArabEmirates, Iran, Malaysia, as well as Turkey, and he travelled to mostof these countries more than once. This is particularly importantbecause contributors to the History Commons have put together evidencesuggesting that Sakra was a CIA asset before 9/11, which would suggestthat Al Suqami and other hijackers were actually trained by a CIA asset.
[*]WhenAhmed Alghamdi arrived in the US from London on May 5, 2001, animmigration inspector apparently noted that Alghamdi commented to himthat the media was distorting the facts about Osama bin Laden and thatbin Laden was a good Muslim. Alghamdi also indicated that he wastravelling with more than $10,000 worth of currency. Shortly after9/11, the New York Times, Washington Post, and other newspapersreported that by the spring of 2001, US customs was investigating Alghamdi and two other future 9/11 hijackersfor their connections to known al-Qaeda operatives. One Britishnewspaper even noted that Alghamdi should have been “instantly‘red-flagged’ by British intelligence” as he passed through London onhis way to the US because of a warning about his links to al-Qaeda.It has not been explained how Alghamdi was able to pass through Britishand US customs, even as he was openly praising bin Laden.
[*]HijackerNawaf Alhazmi was mugged outside of his apartment in Alexandria,Virginia, by an “unknown black male” on May 1, 2001. He filed a policereport about this and gave his correct name and address. In August2001, Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar were watchlisted by the CIA, and an FBI investigator began looking for them in the US.But, as one news report later noted, the investigator “never performedone of the most basic tasks of a police manhunt. He never ran Almihdharor Alhazmi through the NCIC computer,” a widely used police databasethat should have listed this mugging, as well as a speeding ticket Alhazmi had received the month before.
[*]On August 26, 2001, Nawaf Alhazmi’s car was queried by police in Totowa, New Jersey, just a few miles from where he was living in Paterson.Police took down details of his rental car and put all the informationin the NCIC database. On August 29, with Alhazmi still living inPaterson, an FBI agent was assigned to look for him. But as mentionedabove, he didn’t search the NCIC database. On September 2, this agentdid search a national motor vehicle database,and this, the mugging, and other encounters Alhazmi had with policeshould have shown up there as well, but for some inexplicable reasonthe agent still did not discover that Alhazmi was in the US.
[*]HijackerAbdulaziz Alomari lost his plane ticket just before 9/11. He reportedit lost on September 8, and picked a replacement ticket up from theAmerican Airlines terminal at Logan airport in Boston the next day. TheUS government has generally promoted what one FBI official has called “the Superman scenario” - the idea that the hijackers made no mistakes. For instance, in 2004 one FBI official claimed, “These guys were pros. For us to have done anything, these guys had to make a mistake. And they didn’t.”[/list]

A completely redacted page from the FBI’s timeline. [Source: Public domain]
Unfortunately, much of the FBI timeline is heavily censored, withentire pages sometimes being completely redacted. But from what we doknow, this timeline indicates that many questions remain about thehijackers and the 9/11 attacks. We know that the FBI’s timeline wasavailable to the 9/11 Commission, so why did the commission fail tomention any of the information listed above?
It’s interesting to compare the results of the 9/11 Commissionwith the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry that proceeded it. For instance,while the 9/11 Commission downplayed any possible ties between thehijackers and the Saudi government, the 9/11 Congressional Inquirywrote an entire chapter on the topic. Unfortunately, all 28 pages ofthat chapter were censored. But Sen. Bob Graham, co-chair of theinquiry, later claimed that evidence relating to the two hijackers wholived in San Diego “presented a compelling case that there was Saudiassistance” to the 9/11 plot. He alleged that Omar al-Bayoumi in factwas a Saudi intelligence agent. He also concluded that President Bush directed the FBI “to restrain and obfuscate” investigations into these ties.
Now, we’re finally beginning to see some of what was in those missing 28 pages. One anonymous official who has seen the pages claims:“We’re not talking about rogue elements. We’re talking about acoordinated network that reaches right from the hijackers to multipleplaces in the Saudi government.”
The 9/11 Commission also downplayed the idea that thehijackers had any assistance in the US. The 9/11 Congressional Inquiry,by contrast, noted that many people who interacted with the hijackersin the US, including Omar al-Bayoumi, were under FBI investigation even before 9/11.
Unfortunately, neither the 9/11 Commission nor the 9/11Congressional Inquiry was a complete and unbiased investigation. Ifthis timeline reflects just some of what only the FBI knew about thehijackers one month after the attacks, one can only guess at how muchmore all the US agencies combined know about the hijackers now. Why isthat information being kept secret?
FBI document:
FBI Hijackers Timeline, cover sheet, pages 1-105
FBI Hijackers Timeline, pages 106-210
FBI Hijackers Timeline, pages 211-297
FBI Hijackers Timeline, zip file of whole document