After the failed 1961 invasion attempt of Cuba by U.S.-backed Cuban exiles, Kennedy discussed the Bay of Pigs incident with a Supreme Court justice named William O. Douglas. “That episode burned him,” Douglas later said:
“He had experienced the extraordinary power these groups possessed, the various kinds of covert influence that the CIA and the Pentagon exerted over civilian policy, and I think it raised a fear in his mind: Could Jack Kennedy, President of the United States, ever be strong enough to truly control these two powerful institutions? I believe it had a profound effect … it shook him deeply!”¹
Although Kennedy was upset by what had happened, he fully understood the danger of the situation and the importance of keeping a cool head.
During a conversation with Secretary of the Navy Paul Fay, he made it clear that no one would force him to do something he did not believe was in the nation’s interest:
“I will never compromise the principles upon which this country was built,” Kennedy declared, “but we are not going to rush into an irresponsible action simply because a fanatical group in this country places so-called national pride above national interests.”
Fay had little reason to doubt the President’s determination on this point.
“Do you think I am going to have it on my conscience that I was responsible for the reckless maiming and killing of children?” Kennedy exclaimed. “Do you think I am going to start a nuclear war? If you or anyone else believes that, then you’re crazy.”
It had also become clear to him that both the military and the intelligence services had attempted to paint him into a corner.²
“Looking back on it now, I realize damn well that they (the Pentagon and the CIA) had no intention of giving me straight answers on this issue,” Kennedy snapped. “They thought that once we became involved, I would simply say, ‘Go ahead, now you can throw all our forces in there and just take Cuba.’ … Well, from now on, it is John Kennedy who decides whether or not we are going to do these things.”³
In a later conversation with aide Dave Powers, Kennedy remarked about the CIA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
“They were sure I would give in to them and authorize the Essex. They couldn’t believe that a new president like me wouldn’t panic and try to save face. They miscalculated completely.”⁴
Just over ten days after the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, Kennedy delivered a speech entitled “The President and the Press” before the American Newspaper Publishers Association at the Waldorf Astoria New York.
The speech is arguably one of the most remarkable ever delivered by an American president—or by any politician, for that matter:
“The very word ‘secrecy’ is repugnant in a free and open society,” Kennedy declared, noting that Americans had historically been opposed to secret societies, secret oaths, and secret proceedings.
He continued:
“We decided long ago that the dangers of excessive and unwarranted concealment of pertinent facts far outweighed the dangers which are cited to justify it.”
And further:
“There is very grave danger that an announced need for increased security will be seized upon by those anxious to expand its meaning to the very limits of official censorship and concealment.”⁵
Here is the English translation of the text, keeping the tone precise and incorporating the official wording of JFK’s famous ”President and the Press” speech where applicable:
Words that feel just as relevant today, not least after the Patriot Act was enacted following September 11th, which repealed, or overrode, parts of the U.S. Constitution. It is, of course, easy to imagine that such an initiative was hardly applauded by the leadership of the CIA or Skull & Bones.
Especially not considering that Kennedy stated he did not intend to allow it as long as it was within his control to prevent it: “For we are opposed around the world by a monolithic and ruthless conspiracy,” he explained, ”that relies primarily on covert means for expanding its sphere of influence—on infiltration instead of invasion, on subversion instead of elections, on intimidation instead of free choice, on guerrillas by night instead of armies by day.”6
Even if this particular statement must largely be considered related to the communist threat, it can also be applied to the covert operations that the U.S. intelligence community was engaged in—just as when Kennedy, in the rest of his speech, spoke of it being a system that has conscripted vast human and material resources into the building of a tightly knit, highly efficient machine that combines military, diplomatic, intelligence, economic, scientific and political operations, and whose preparations are concealed, not published.
”…. dissent is silenced, not praised. No expenditure is questioned, no rumor is printed, no secret is revealed. No President should fear public scrutiny of his program. For from that scrutiny comes understanding; and from that understanding comes support or opposition. And both are necessary.”7
On September 20, 1963, Kennedy delivered a speech before the United Nations in which he signaled hope for further easing of tensions between the superpowers. He then proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union cooperate in placing a man on the Moon, a suggestion that surprised many among Washington’s elite.
The Space Race had been a major issue for the Kennedy administration when it entered the White House, and the idea that the United States would cooperate with the Russians to send a man to the Moon seemed extraordinary.
Kennedy argued, however, that the Soviet Union and the United States, together with their allies, could reach further agreements based on their shared interest in avoiding mutual destruction. He subsequently succeeded in securing a nuclear test ban treaty with the Soviet Union.
In October 1963, one month before the shots were fired in Dallas, Kennedy issued National Security Memorandum 263, which called for preparations to bring home the American troops stationed in Vietnam:
“To establish a program for training Vietnamese so that essential functions now performed by U.S. military personnel can be carried out by Vietnamese by the end of 1965. It should be possible to withdraw the bulk of U.S. personnel by that time.” (author’s emphasis)
In other words, entirely consistent with what Kennedy had told several aides and senators such as Mansfield and Morse, he intended to bring the American soldiers home by 1965.
NSAM 263 shows that Kennedy approved the withdrawal of 1,000 troops from Vietnam beginning at the end of 1963 and expected that the remainder could be withdrawn by 1965. He simply did not want to say so publicly.
In every respect, these were prudent decisions: it was right to bring the troops home, and tactically wise not to advertise the plan before he had been re-elected.
From another perspective, however, it may have been a disastrous decision, as the planned withdrawal may have been one of the factors that contributed to his death.
And now we come to the truly interesting part:
Less than 24 hours before Kennedy’s assassination, Kennedy’s National Security Advisor, McGeorge Bundy, suddenly signed a draft of a new memorandum, NSAM 273, which altered the policy regarding the United States’ withdrawal from Vietnam.
Among other things, the memorandum stated:
“We should concentrate our own efforts … military … political, economic, social, educational, and informational work. We should seek to turn not only the battle but the conviction … to increase not only our control of territory but also the productivity of the area.”⁸
Bundy also wrote that:
“The President has reviewed the discussions on South Vietnam held in Honolulu and has discussed the matter with Ambassador Lodge.”
According to the author, both of these statements are demonstrably incorrect.
The majority of those attending the Honolulu conference arrived on November 19, while the remainder arrived early the following morning. The conference itself then took place on November 20 and 21. Since Kennedy was assassinated on November 22, the implication is that he could not have reviewed discussions that had not yet concluded when the memorandum was drafted.
Because Kennedy and his entourage had departed from Washington that same day, and Bundy drafted the memorandum on the evening of the 21st,⁹ it is apparent that Kennedy could not have reviewed discussions that had only just taken place in Honolulu.
Nor could he have had time to discuss the conference with Ambassador Lodge before Bundy’s draft of NSAM 273 was written.
Furthermore, the official documentation of the conference stated that the meeting had ended “inconclusively,” even though Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had informed participants that the United States intended to withdraw its troops from Vietnam, but that the process was proceeding too slowly and therefore needed to be accelerated.
Bundy went on to write:
“After Lodge had discussed the matter with the President in Washington a few days later, the White House attempted to draw together some conclusions and provide guidance for our continuing and now deeper involvement in Vietnam.”¹⁰
Read that sentence again:
“our continuing and now deeper involvement in Vietnam.”
In other words: contrary to what Kennedy’s previous memorandum had stated.
The President referred to in this document could not have been Kennedy, since he never left Dallas alive and therefore could not have spoken with Ambassador Lodge a few days later. The only person the draft could therefore have been referring to was Lyndon B. Johnson, who was still Vice President when it was written.
Following Johnson’s meeting with Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. on November 26, he signed the final version of NSAM 273.
In other words:
The day after Kennedy was buried, his plan for a troop withdrawal from Vietnam was buried as well.
There is, however, additional evidence to consider.
Analyst Marjorie Alice Coolidge Judge worked for twenty years in the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon.
In April 1963, she received orders originating from President Kennedy that all American personnel were to be out of Vietnam no later than December 1965.
Coolidge Judge held a security clearance several levels above Top Secret, was the highest-paid female analyst in her field, and was responsible for preparing long-range projections of national war expenditures extending five years into the future.
During those twenty years, she had never previously been required to revise her long-term projections.
Many years later, her son, John Judge, recalled:
“Before Kennedy’s death, she knew from those figures and projections that the Pentagon was planning a withdrawal of troops from Vietnam … that Kennedy was going to pull out of Vietnam.”¹¹
When her son asked her when the Pentagon had informed them that it intended instead to escalate the war, his mother replied that they had done so on the Monday following the assassination in Dallas. She said she had been shocked that the military leadership had reversed Kennedy’s Vietnam policy by more than 180 degrees only a few days after his death:
“She couldn’t believe the numbers. She took them back to the Pentagon and made what must have been the first civilian protest against the war when she said, ‘This can’t be right.’ The officials replied that she was to use the figures, that the war would last ten years, that the casualties would amount to 57,000 men, and that she should include that in her calculations.”¹²
Michael Delavante, The Assassination of President Kennedy – Part 3
Sources:
- L. Fletcher Prouty ,“The Secret Team: The CIA and Its Allies in Control of the United States and the World,” Skyhorse Publishing, 2011, (page 500)
2. Antony Jay, “Lend Me Your Ears: Oxford Dictionary of Political Quotations,” OUP Oxford; 4 edition , 2010, (page 167)
3. Paul B. Fay, ”The Pleasure of His Company,” Harper & Row, 1966, (page 188)
4. Paul B. Fay, ”The Pleasure of His Company,” Harper & Row, 1966, (page 188)
5. President John F. KennedyWaldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York City April 27, 1961. http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Ready-Reference/JFK-Speeches/The-President-and-the-Press-Address-before-the-American-Newspaper-Publishers-Association.aspx
6. President John F. KennedyWaldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York City April 27, 1961. http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Ready-Reference/JFK-Speeches/The-President-and-the-Press-Address-before-the-American-Newspaper-Publishers-Association.aspx
7. President John F. KennedyWaldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York City April 27, 1961. http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Ready-Reference/JFK-Speeches/The-President-and-the-Press-Address-before-the-American-Newspaper-Publishers-Association.aspx
8. James G. Blight, Janet M. Lang, David A. Welch, “Virtual JFK: Vietnam If Kennedy Had Lived”, 2010, (page 202-203) Also see: The Fourth Decade: A Journal of Research on the John F. Vol 1-2, University of Wisconsin, 1993, (sidan 30)
9. National Security Action Memorandum Number 273 – Introduktion. By Greg Burnham. http://assassinationofjfk.net/national-security-action-memorandum-number-273-introduction/
10. The Pentagon Papers, Volume 2 (Gravel Edition) https://www.scribd.com/document/156683848/The-Pentagon-Papers-Volume-2-Gravel-Edition
11. John Judge on C-Span’s ”JFK: Cinema as History” (Jan. 1992)
12. John Judge on C-Span’s ”JFK: Cinema as History” (Jan. 1992)
